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THE ROLE OF CONSUMER SURVEYS IN
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With millions, perhaps billions, of dollars at stake in the value of a
brand,1 brand equity can be one of the most important assets in a firm’s
portfolio.2 Unfortunately, brand equity is an asset that is uniquely
vulnerable to harm. Firms can lose the strength, and thus the selling power,
of those brands through the ordinary course of business.3 Even a firm’s
* Associate Professor and Northeast Utilities Chair in Business Ethics, School of Business,
University of Connecticut. We thank Meredith Long and Michael Thomason for valuable
research assistance. We also thank Barton Beebe for sharing his data with us.
** Professor of Marketing, Stern School of Business, New York University.
1. A ranking by Bloomberg Businessweek of the top one hundred global brands
reveals estimated values for many top brands in excess of ten billion dollars. BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, 100 BEST GLOBAL BRANDS 1, available at, http://www.businessweek
.com/interactive_reports/best_global_brands_2009.html. The top hundred most valuable
global brands are worth more than two trillion dollars. See KEN SCHEPT, BRANDZ TOP 100
MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS (MilwardBrown 2010), available at http://c1547732.cdn.
cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/BrandZ_Top100_2010.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1,
28 (2008) (highlighting Google’s use of brand equity for competitive advantage); Sonia K.
Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58
BUFF. L. REV. 795, 804 (2010) (noting that the value of a firm’s brand equity can exceed the
book value ascribed to its product). See generally Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary
Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 945–54 (2006) (describing the value
of brand equity); Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time
Has Gone: Brand Equity as Protectable Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 219, 219–20 (1994) (positing that brand equity is a property right that should be
entitled to its own protection); Judith Zaichkowsky, Strategies for Distinctive Brands, 17 J.
BRAND MGMT. 548, 548 (2010) (stating the generally accepted principle that brand equity is
essential for successful marketing). For in-depth work on brands from a leading author on
the issue, see DAVID A. AAKER, BRAND RELEVANCE: MAKING COMPETITORS IRRELEVANT
(2010); DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS (1995); DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING
BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME (1991).
3. Negative brand effects can occur in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Luis J. Diaz &
Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the Revolving Door Syndrome in Law, 41 SETON HALL L.

1013

BIRD_FINAL_2379679.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1014

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

7/16/2012 5:30 PM

[Vol. 14:4

own misguided behavior through mismanagement or over-popularization of
the brand can dilute the influence of even the most elite of brand names.4
Damage to a brand can be so devastating that a firm may wish to
deliberately and permanently disassociate itself from its meaning to
consumers.5
Brand equity is no less vulnerable to the actions of competitors. For
example, if one firm uses another’s famous brand in a way that would
confuse consumers, the value of the brand to its established owner would
suffer.6 In such circumstances the owner of the brand could sue the
challenger for trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act,
which prohibits an unauthorized user of a trademark from using it in a way
that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”7
Litigants protecting their marks have traditionally presented three
different types of evidence to prove in court a likelihood of confusion by a

REV. 947, 962 (2011) (discussing brand reputation for professional service firms); Steve
Hartman, Brand Equity Impairment—The Meaning of Dilution, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 418,
428–33 (1997) (describing brand equity impact in a variety of consumer contexts); Anupam
Jaju et al., Consumer Evaluations of Corporate Brand Redeployments, 34 J. ACAD.
MARKETING SCI. 206, 206 (2006) (discussing merger and acquisition activities).
4. Gucci diluted its elite brand by attaching its name to 22,000 widely different
products, some of which were of low quality and of questionable connection to the Gucci
image. See Kevin Lane Keller, Managing the Growth Tradeoff: Challenges and
Opportunities in Luxury Branding, 16 J. BRAND MGMT. 290, 298 (2008). See generally
Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand
Extensions Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J. MARKETING 71 (1993) (examining situations in
which brand extensions are likely to dilute beliefs associated with family brand name);
Pavel Štrach & André M. Everett, Brand Corrosion: Mass-Marketing’s Threat to Luxury
Automobile Brands After Merger and Acquisition, 15 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 106,
115–16 (2006) (finding dilution in luxury brands subsequent to overextension of models and
production quantities).
5. See Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 2 (2010) (“When a brand suffers from strong negative consumer perceptions, it
transforms from a valuable asset to a major liability. Faced with the reality of an irreparably
damaged brand, many firms understandably seek a fresh start.”).
6. In trademark disputes, the firm that has established rights to the trademark and
asserts that a rival is engaging in potentially infringing behavior is known as the senior user
of the trademark. The mark itself is frequently called a senior mark. Correspondingly, the
company that is being challenged for an allegedly infringing use is known as the junior user,
and its challenged mark is known as the junior mark. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:10 (4th ed. 2012) (“[W]hen a
junior user uses a mark similar to a senior user’s mark such that there is a likelihood of
confusion, this is infringement which may be enjoined. Thus, the scope of exclusivity of a
trademark is coextensive with the prevention of confusion of customers.”); Thomas R. Lee,
Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859, 885–86 (2004) (“Dilution occurs . . . whenever
a junior mark interferes with a trademark’s ability to function as an identifier of a unique
source of goods.”).
7. 15 U.S.C § 1114 (2005).
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rival.8 Expert witnesses can testify about their beliefs regarding confusion,9
but such testimony may not represent the consumer’s state of mind and can
devolve into a “battle of the experts” between hired guns paid to support a
particular position.10 Litigants also make visual comparisons between
marks,11 but such comparisons represent only a fraction of what consumers
might discern in order to determine whether a trademark comes from a
particular source.
The third type of evidence, and the one that has intrigued courts and
scholars for decades, is the consumer survey.12 A consumer survey is an
instrument used to gather data on the beliefs and attitudes of consumers

8. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 23:2.50.
9. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 23:2.75; Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion
Evidence in Federal Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 28
(1994) (“The best evidence of actual confusion is evidence of individuals who have
purchased, as a result of similar trademarks, the product of one of the parties under the
mistaken belief that they are purchasing the other party’s product.”); Keith M. Stolte,
Remedying Judicial Limitations on Trademark Remedies: Monetary Relief Should Not
Require Proof of Actual Confusion, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 229, 235–36 (1997) (stating that
consumer testimony relating to purchases made as a result of confusion is strong evidence of
actual confusion).
10. Alison M. Andrews, Note, Implied Misrepresentations in Advertisements Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act: American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 47 ALB. L. REV. 97, 130 (1982) (citing the landmark survey case of Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Judge Richard Posner
has also remarked on the problem of expert testimony in the context of trademark litigation:
Many experts are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a modest) fee to
bend their science in the direction from which their fee is coming. The
constraints that the market in consultant services for lawyers places on this sort
of behavior are weak, as shown by the fact that both experts in this case were
hired and, we have no doubt, generously remunerated even though both have
been criticized in previous judicial opinions. The judicial constraints on
tendentious expert testimony are inherently weak because judges (and even
more so juries, though that is not an issue in a trademark case) lack training or
experience in the relevant fields of expert knowledge. But that is the system we
have.
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 415
(7th Cir. 1994).
11. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 23:2.50.
12. See, e.g., Robert C. Sorensen & Theodore C. Sorensen, Responding to Objections
Against the Use of Opinion Survey Findings in the Courts, 20 J. MARKETING 133 (1955)
(arguing in 1955 that current methods of opinion research were sufficiently developed to
make a definite contribution to judicial process); Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence:
The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HARV. L. REV. 498 (1953) (examining evidential and practical
problems involved in using surveys in litigation).

BIRD_FINAL_2379679.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1016

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

7/16/2012 5:30 PM

[Vol. 14:4

towards products, concepts, or names.13 This data is gathered through a
variety of means, including consumer queries through shopping malls,
telephone contacts, and the Internet.14 Litigants use such surveys to
convince a court that consumer confusion exists (or does not exist) between
trademarks in lawsuits alleging trademark infringement.15 Consumer
surveys provide direct evidence about consumer perceptions that expert
testimony lacks and elicit multifaceted information about perceptions that
mere visual comparison does not provide.
It is no wonder, then, that both courts and commentators hold
consumer surveys in high esteem. Surveys are considered to have both
widespread acceptance and vital influence in trademark infringement
cases.16 Courts have on occasion even faulted litigants for not bringing a
survey17 and expressed little sympathy even when a small company cannot
bear the high costs of administering one.18 While courts instruct that
surveys are not essential, some do not hesitate to remind litigants that
consumer surveys are the most direct method of showing a likelihood of
13. E.g., Robert C. Bird, Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: An Examination of
the Concept of Universe in Consumer Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88
TRADEMARK REP. 269, 270 (1998) (“A consumer survey is a scientific method of presenting
evidence of mental associations of a given group of people by asking a representative
sample of the relevant target group. In other words, surveys gather data on the attitudes and
beliefs of consumers towards a given product, name, or concept.”) (footnote omitted);
Henry D. Ostberg, Response to the Article Entitled, “A ‘Reading’ Test or a ‘Memory’ Test:
Which Survey Methodology is Correct?,” 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1446, 1446 (2005)
(“Consumer surveys used as evidence in trademark litigation frequently involve showing
respondents one or more products, advertisements or marks and asking the respondents for
their perceptions and beliefs about these stimuli.”).
14. Bird, supra note 13, at 270.
15. See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking
Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and
Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620 (2004) (arguing that such reliance makes
trademark cases fact–driven, and thus judicial determinations of likelihood of confusion are
necessarily subjective and impressionistic).
16. See, e.g., Gabriel M. Gelb & Betsy D. Gelb, Internet Surveys for Trademark
Litigation: Ready or Not, Here They Come, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1073, 1075 (2007) (noting
a general increase of survey use in litigation since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert); Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys—Social “Science” as Evidence, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 957, 957 (2002) (stating that survey evidence is necessary in some
litigation under the Lanham Act); Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on
Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 364, 364 (1993) (supporting the routine implementation and resulting
importance of survey use).
17. See Gimix, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., No. 80 C 6592, 1982 WL 52164, at *1006
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1982), aff’d, 699 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1983) (admonishing both sides for
failing to produce consumer surveys).
18. Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 154,
164 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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confusion among consumers in trademark infringement cases.19 Consumer
surveys seem to matter.
However, in spite of the hundreds of articles and court cases that
analyze consumer surveys, very little data-driven evidence exists to show
that consumer surveys are actually widespread, influential, and important.
The literature suffers from a lack of an empirical understanding about how
federal courts actually treat consumer surveys, in spite of what scholars and
judges write about surveys in publications and judicial opinions.
Addressing this issue is not just yet another attempt to fill a scholarly gap,
but also has great practical implications for firms faced with defending
their multi-million or billion-dollar brands in court. Consumer surveys are
expensive to create and time consuming to administer.20 Thus, developing
survey evidence can drain a firm’s limited resources.
We present an empirical study investigating the role of consumer
surveys in federal courts by examining more than five hundred court
opinions over a seven-year period. Using these data, this article has three
objectives. First, we assess how often consumer surveys are actually used
in federal trademark infringement cases, notwithstanding the anecdotal
assessment of survey use as pervasive. Second, we contemplate the rarely
considered question of whether submission by a plaintiff or defendant
influences the treatment of the survey by the court. In theory, it should
make no difference at all, but the data have the real potential to prove
otherwise. Third, we examine whether the strength of the underlying
evidence in trademark cases impacts the power of the survey. Consumer
surveys could be equally helpful or most influential when other evidence is
absent. From these three objectives, we conclude that survey evidence is
19. E.g., Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting CoRect Prods. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985))
(“Consumer surveys are recognized by several circuits as the most direct and persuasive
evidence of secondary meaning.”); see also Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software
Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 282 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that surveys are not essential
where other evidence of confusion exists).
20. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the
monetary and time investment in consumer surveys); Dan Sarel & Howard Marmorstein,
The Effect of Consumer Surveys and Actual Confusion Evidence in Trademark Litigation:
An Empirical Assessment, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1416, 1416 (2009) (“Obtaining any data
from consumers, particularly when a properly conducted survey is entailed, is a complex,
time-consuming, and expensive process.”); see also Lon Tai Shing Co., Ltd. v. Kotch +
Lowy, No. 90 Civ. 4464(DNE), 1991 WL 170734, at *19 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991)
(claiming that in 1990 surveys could cost as much as $65,000); Robert C. Bird, The Impact
of the Moseley Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 102,
104 (2007) (stating that surveys can cost between $50,000 and $100,000); Rebecca Tushnet,
Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1305, 1339 (2011) (noting that consumer surveys are prohibitively expensive for
smaller businesses).
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used infrequently, treated subjectively, and has the potential to be either
dispositive or useless depending on the context of the underlying evidence.
We complete our article by explaining how firms can use our results to
calculate mathematically whether developing a consumer survey is
worthwhile given the firm’s status as plaintiff or defendant and the strength
of the underlying evidence.
Part I of this article reviews the Lanham Act, explores the survey
literature, and highlights the reception given to consumer surveys by
federal courts. Part II introduces our dataset and its method of analysis.
Part III presents the results of our empirical testing and explains our costbenefit analysis for choosing whether to create survey evidence. Part IV
briefly presents policy implications and limitations of our study. Part V
concludes.
I.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND CONSUMER SURVEYS

A.

The Lanham Act

A trademark is a word or design used on an article of merchandise to
identify it as the product of a particular manufacturer and to distinguish it
from others.21 Trademarks are said to facilitate the transmission of accurate
information and protect the consumer from confusion as to the source of a
given product.22 Trademarks also establish a product’s distinctiveness from
its competitors, signal quality or other positive attributes, and serve as
promotional tools.23 Trademarks prevent consumers from being less able to
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol,
or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . .”); 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra
note 6, at § 3:1 (explaining that trademarks “identify the source of one seller’s goods and
distinguish that source from other sources.”); Vincent-Wayne Mitchell & Íde Kearney, A
Critique of Legal Measures of Brand Confusion, 11 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 357, 359
(2002).
22. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 556 (2006) (noting that trademark law is designed to
enable reliable transmission of information); Misha Gregory Macaw, Google, Inc. v.
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.: A Justification for the Use of Trademarks as
Keywords to Trigger Paid Advertising Placements in Internet Search Engine Results, 32
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (2005) (“[T]rademarks . . . accurately reflect the
producer associated with any individual product and consumers will be able to safely rely on
trademarks as information sources in their purchasing decisions.”).
23. Jacob Jacoby & Maureen Morrin, “Not Manufactured or Authorized by. . .”:
Recent Federal Cases Involving Trademark Disclaimers, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING
97, 97 (1998); Charles R. Taylor & Michael G. Walsh, Legal Strategies for Protecting
Brands from Genericide: Recent Trends in Evidence Weighted in Court Cases, 21 J. PUB.
POL’Y & MARKETING 160, 160 (2002).
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distinguish desired products from their competitors.24
Trademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing consumer
search costs.25 A consumer can look to trademarks as shorthand indicators
of quality, prestige, or product attributes.26 Producers benefit because they
can invest in building goodwill with the confidence that others will not
appropriate it.27 Consumers benefit because trademarks relieve the burden
of having to do exhaustive research about a product’s features.28 While
marketers do not speak of trademarks per se, they attribute these same

24. Others characterize the prevention of consumer confusion as the primary goal of
trademark infringement protection. E.g., Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the
Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923,
940 (1985) (“The goal of the legislation is not to protect the business enterprise’s trademark
from encroachment, but to protect consumers from confusion . . . .”); F. T. Alexandra
Mahaney, Comment, Incontestability: The Park ‘N Fly Decision, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1149,
1151–52 (1986) (“A trademark generally performs four functions deserving of protection:
(1) it identifies one seller’s product and distinguishes a product from similar products sold
by others; (2) it signifies that all goods bearing the same trademark come from a single
source; (3) it signifies that all goods bearing the same trademark are of equal quality; and (4)
it is a prime instrument in the advertisement and sale of goods”) (footnote omitted); Kenneth
L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in
the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 896 (2000) (“[T]he principal legal goal of the
system is to protect the consumer from confusion.”) (footnote omitted); see also Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982) (noting that the two goals of
the Lanham Act are to protect trademark owners and to protect consumers from confusing
goods made by competing manufacture).
25. See Bone, supra note 22, at 555 (noting that trademarks reduce consumer search
costs); see also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental
purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs . . . .”); Macaw, supra note 22, at
15 (claiming that search costs are reduced when there is no source confusion).
26. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2173 (2004) (claiming that trademarks protect a product’s “goodwill” or prestige
value); Bone, supra note 22, at 554 (describing the use of trademarks as indicators); Daniel
J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 505, 521 (2005) (stating that trademarks indicate the source of the good and can
indicate the desired level of quality); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029,
1034 (2006) (citing the classical view that a trademark is a proxy for certain product
features).
27. See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 958 (2001) (asserting that trademarks “encourage
producers to invest” knowing that their investment cannot be “poach[ed]” by competitors);
cf. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 752 (2004) (arguing
that unprotected marks would diminish the goodwill associated with the mark).
28. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (reasoning
that trademark law “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions . . . .” (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01(2), at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994))); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777,
778 (2004) (stating that trademark law can improve the flow of information in markets).
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functions to brands.29 Indeed, trademarks are essentially what marketers
refer to as branding elements, the most salient being the brand name.30
The statute most responsible for protecting trademarks against
confusion is the Lanham Act of 1946.31 The Act prohibits the unauthorized
use of a registered mark in a fashion that is “likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.”32 The goals of the Lanham Act are to
provide a cause of action against those who use deceptive or misleading
marks,33 protect mark holders against unfair competition,34 protect the
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers, and avoid
confusion about the potential source of a product.35 Trademark owners

29. See Joel H. Steckel et al., Dilution Through the Looking Glass: A Marketing Look
at the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 621 (2006) (“[I]t
goes without saying that much of what marketers have written about brands applies to
trademarks.”). This does not mean that legal trademark policy and marketing practice
always coordinate harmoniously. One tension is that marketers often want to make their
brands easier to interpret and thus more descriptive. This goal, however, impedes the
lawyer’s goal of protecting the trademark rights that identify those same brands.
Trademarks that are more descriptive in nature have a greater burden to show secondary
meaning than their less descriptive (and more fanciful) counterparts. See id. at 622 n.26.
30. E.g. Keller, supra note 4, at 292 (noting the importance of trademarks in protecting
brand image).
31. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511141n (2006)); Matthew D. Bunker, You Can’t Handle the Truth (In Music): Does the
Lanham Act Preempt State “Truth in Music” Laws?, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2011)
(describing the Lanham Act as the “primary source of federal trademark protection.”);
Edward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need Sound Protection, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333,
352 n.90 (1997) (“The Lanham Act is the primary federal trademark and unfair competition
statute.”); Anne M. Mellen, Comment, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act:
Egregious Litigation Conduct in the “Exceptional” Case, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113
(2006) (describing the primacy of the Lanham Act); see also Marlene B. Hanson & W.
Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark Good Will: The Case for a Federal Standard of
Misappropriation, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 480, 501 (1990) (discussing how state antidilution
laws supplement the Lanham Act).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The intent of this Act is to . . . mak[e] actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used
in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition . . . .”); see also Jennifer E. Rothman,
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 105, 123 (2005) (noting that one purpose of Lanham Act is to regulate deceptive and
misleading uses).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
35. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (stating that
the Lanham Act helps consumers distinguish among competing products); Peter W. Smith,
Note, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer Confusion: A Workable Lanham Act
Infringement Standard, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1525, 1529 (1991) (“One of the principal goals
of the Lanham Act is to protect consumers from confusion and deception in the
marketplace.”).
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who can successfully prove their case in court can obtain an injunction
against the infringer to prevent the use from continuing.36
Typically, the senior user of the mark is the plaintiff and alleges that
the junior user’s (i.e., the defendant’s) use of the same or a similar mark
creates a likelihood of confusion.37 A small number of declaratory
judgment cases reverse the typical role of plaintiff and defendant in that the
plaintiff in those cases is the junior user asking the court to declare that a
mark does not infringe.38 In these declaratory judgment cases, the
defendant (i.e., the senior user) often responds with a trademark
infringement counterclaim and endeavors to show that a likelihood of
confusion of its trademark has indeed occurred by the junior user.39
A single statutory framework governs how a likelihood-of-confusion
of relevant consumers is proven and remedied in federal court.40 Yet,
considerable variance exists as to how this framework is interpreted and
applied. In 1961, the landmark case of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp. established a list of factors that a court should consider
when determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.41 The Second
Circuit listed eight factors relevant for determining consumer confusion:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity between
plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the
likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2006).
37. See Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the
Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1828 (2000) (asserting that
the traditional trademark infringement claim occurs when a senior user asserts her trademark
is misappropriated by the junior user in order to confuse consumers about the source of the
good); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at §§ 24:1 (describing the typical process for trademark
infringement claims); Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual
Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1204 n.13 (2008) (“The typical trademark
infringement case involves a claim of direct confusion in which a defendant (the ‘junior’ or
second user) exploits the goodwill of an established ‘senior’ user by selling products with a
trademark so similar to the established company’s trademark that consumers mistakenly
believe the junior user’s products come from the senior user.”).
38. See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at §§ 32:50, :57 (describing the reversal of roles that occurs in a
small number of cases).
39. When we built our dataset (to be discussed shortly), we consistently treated the
senior user as the plaintiff and the junior user as the defendant, even in declaratory judgment
cases, to account for the typical incentives of the parties.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 27:13; Sheldon W. Halpern, A
High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, Traffix, Moseley, and Dastar—The Supreme
Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 237, 248 (2005)
(discussing the Lanham Act and the “peculiar federal scheme” for remedies).
41. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
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defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant’s
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.42
The thirteen federal circuits, being largely independent operating
jurisdictions, developed their own equivalents of Polaroid factors for
proving likelihood of confusion.43 Although some tests are similar to one
another, considerable variance exists among circuits.44 While some circuits
list at least ten factors, other circuits only articulate six or seven.45 While
all circuits consider the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity of the
two marks, and the defendant’s intent, only six circuits consider the
similarity of sales facilities and only ten circuits consider the sophistication
of the consumer in determining the likelihood of confusion.46 Furthermore,
four circuits do not consider the similarity of advertising and marketing
methods between the litigants.47 The result is that considerable variance
exists among circuits about the proof necessary to show likelihood of
confusion.48 Table 1 lists the various Polaroid factors used by the different

42. Id. The court also acknowledged that this list was not exhaustive and that other
variables may need to be considered. Id.
43. Likelihood-of-confusion tests vary significantly among circuits. See Boston Duck
Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Pignons S.A. de
Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981)) (eight
factors); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th
Cir. 1982) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979))
(eight factors); AMF, 599 F.2d at 348–49 (eight factors); Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 (eight
factors); Malarkey-Taylor Assocs. v. Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Ass’n, 929 F. Supp. 473,
477 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495) (eight factors), with Interpace Corp. v.
Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold,
Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978)) (ten factors); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (thirteen factors), Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I
Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998) (seven factors); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747
F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev.,
Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981)) (seven factors); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church
& Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Veb Carl
Zeiss Jena, Steelmasters, Inc., 433 F.2d 686, 705 (2d Cir. 1970)) (seven factors); SquirtCo v.
Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (six factors); Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v.
Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing King of the Mountain Sports,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1999)) (six factors, with one factor
combining two commonly separate criteria); Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508,
1514 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833,
840 (11th Cir. 1983)) (seven factors).
44. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 24:30 (“[E]ach of the 13 federal circuit courts of appeal has
developed its own version of the list and each appears to be jealous of its own formulation
of factors.”).
45. See infra Table 1.
46. See infra Table 1.
47. See infra Table 1.
48. See infra Table 1.
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federal circuits.
B.

Research in Consumer Surveys by Legal and Marketing Scholars

Scholars explore consumer surveys from a variety of perspectives. In
addition to the case-based analysis commonly seen in law reviews,49 there
is also a focus on consumer surveys in the marketing literature. Legal
developments impact marketing strategies and, in turn, innovations in
marketing research influence how courts apply legal protections.50
Trademarks are also understood as strategic marketing tools.51 The result is
49. E.g., Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a Survey in Trademark Infringement
Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 768–69 (2000)
(analyzing how courts respond to a plaintiff’s failure to present survey evidence); NatalieClaire Woods, Survey, Survey Evidence in Lanham Act Violations, 15 TRINITY L. REV. 67,
77–79 (2008) (comparing survey methods).
50. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 836 (2004) (“[M]arketing professionals still seek to produce the kind of
unthinking responses to brands that much trademark law assumes occurs . . . .”); Ross D.
Petty, The Codevelopment of Trademark Law and the Concept of Brand Marketing in the
United States Before 1946, 31 J. MACROMARKETING 85, 90 (2011) (noting that judicial
enforcement encouraged manufacturers to invest in brand marketing); Swann, supra note 2,
at 945 (claiming that “explosive developments” in marketing since the 1960s translated into
“more predictable, accurate and consumer-beneficial” results in trademark disputes); David
S. Welkowitz, Famous Marks Under the TDRA, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 983, 994 (2009)
(arguing that the expansion of infringement protection to include non-competing products
solidified the role of trademarks as a marketing tool); Erin Lenhardt, Note, Why So Glum?
Toward a Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the
Well-Being of the Mentally Ill Consumers it Targets, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 165, 181 (2005)
(stating that from a marketing perspective, trademark law protects brand equity, which is
built through widespread exposure of the mark or brand name).
51. See Dorothy Cohen, Trademark Strategy, 50 J. MARKETING 61, 61 (1986) (arguing
that marketers will have to become more familiar with trademark law as they become more
active in setting trademark strategy); Dorothy Cohen, Trademark Strategy Revisited, 55 J.
MARKETING 46, 46 (1991) (arguing that legal developments require marketers to become
familiar with trademark law); Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark
Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1939 (1997) (arguing that a trademark can be a
valuable marketing tool when it conveys information about the product “more efficiently”
than other marketing devices); Alan S. Gutterman, A Legal Due Diligence Framework for
Inbound Transfers of Foreign Technology Rights, 24 INT’L LAW. 976, 987 (1990) (claiming
that trademarks can be valuable marketing tools because they can imply a certain level of
quality); Angela L. Patterson, Comment, With Liberty and Domain Names for All:
Restructuring Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 375, 415
(2003) (arguing that trademarks are marketing tools because they can facilitate a customer’s
ability to find and purchase items on a firm’s website); Ross D. Petty, Naming Names:
Trademark Strategy and Beyond: Part One—Selecting a Brand Name, 15 J. BRAND MGMT.
190, 190 (2008) (examining the interplay between trademark law and marketing strategy in
selecting a brand name and presenting strategies to limit the ability of rivals to select and
use other brand names); John D. Shakow, Note, Just Steal It: Political Sloganeering and the
Rights of Trademark Holders, 14 J.L. & POL. 199, 204 (1998) (stating that well known
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a fairly rich body of information about consumer surveys from a welcome
non-legal perspective.
For example, Stewart evaluated the characteristics of surveys that
were introduced into evidence during an advertising misrepresentation case
brought by the Federal Trade Commission against Kraft in the early
1990s.52 An article by Ford explored the impact of an important United
States Supreme Court decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,53 on the underlying rules of whether a survey is admissible as evidence
at a trial.54 A paper by Hastak, Mazis, and Morris examined the use of
surveys in the development and process of policymaking.55
Studies have also examined the role of consumer surveys in a variety
of trademark contexts that are distinct from infringement cases. For
example, Morrin, Lee, and Allenby measured the extent of harm from
trademark dilution by using a Bayesian version of the associative network
model.56 The study found that even a single exposure to diluting brand
stimuli reduced brand recall by about one-third on average.57 The authors
also used their findings to advise litigants on how to evaluate confusion
factors in trademark dilution lawsuits.58 Another article examined the
reception of consumer surveys by courts in trademark dilution cases and
found that courts remain skeptical of survey evidence in a variety of
contexts.59 In addition to dilution, scholars have reviewed court cases to
evaluate what evidence courts consider in making findings of genericide,
the cancellation of a trademark when consumers use the mark to describe a

trademarks are valuable marketing tools because they “enhance a company’s goodwill by
creating positive associations with customers”).
52. David Stewart, Deception, Materiality, and Survey Research: Some Lessons from
Kraft, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 15, 21–23 (1995).
53. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
54. Gary T. Ford, The Impact of the Daubert Decision on Survey Research Used in
Litigation, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 234, 234 (2005).
55. Manoj Hastak et al., The Role of Consumer Surveys in Public Policy Decision
Making, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 170, 170 (2001).
56. Maureen Morrin et al., Determinants of Trademark Dilution, 33 J. CONSUMER RES.
248, 249 (2006). The associative network memory model in psychology views memory as a
network of nodes, each representing a piece of stored information and connected by links
which reflect the strength of the association between two pieces of information. This theory
casts the brand and the trademark as two nodes in memory. JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE
ARCHITECTURE OF COGNITION (1983); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Person
Memory and Judgment, 96 PSYCH. REV. 59 (1989).
57. Morrin et al., supra note 56, at 253.
58. Id. at 254.
59. Bird, supra note 20, at 102; see also John P. Liefeld, How Surveys Overestimate
the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 939, 941 (2003) (arguing that
surveys can overestimate likelihood of confusion by creating a response bias toward wellknown companies).
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generic category of products rather than a specific brand.60
Development of guidelines and standards for survey evidence is also
an important focus in the legal literature.61 Early research focused on
increasing the likelihood that surveys would even be admissible as
evidence in court.62 Later, Morgan proposed guidelines for developing
survey research for use in court that would reflect explicit and implicit
judicial perspectives of survey research methodology.63 Morgan based his
recommendations on a review of federal cases time incorporated survey
research.64 Legal treatises present elaborate guidelines for devising and
assessing a survey’s effectiveness.65 Guidelines exist on survey design,
population definition and sampling, data entry methods, interview
techniques, and survey question structure in order to elicit accurate and
unbiased results.66 In general, these guidelines conform to standards in
marketing theory and practice.67
C.

Judicial Reception to Survey Research

In judicial opinions, courts have directly discussed the importance of
survey research in likelihood of confusion cases. Courts have called
consumer surveys some of the most direct and persuasive evidence
available to establish trademark infringement.68 The absence of a consumer
60. Taylor & Walsh, supra note 23, at 160.
61. E.g., Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark
Litigation, 19 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 471, 478–80 (1989) (discussing standards of when to
conduct surveys and forms of survey questions); John Paul Reiner, The Universe and
Sample: How Good is Good Enough?, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 366, 366–75 (1983) (discussing
guidelines for the surveys).
62. Fred W. Morgan, The Admissibility of Consumer Surveys as Legal Evidence in
Courts, 43 J. MARKETING 33, 38–39 (1979) (arguing that the increased use of surveys in
court will enhance judges’ sophistication in evaluating survey methodology); Sorensen &
Sorensen, supra note 12, at 133 (arguing in 1955 that survey methods were sufficiently
rigorous and reliable to be used in court).
63. Fred W. Morgan, Judicial Standards for Survey Research: An Update and
Guidelines, 54 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 59, 68–69 (1990).
64. Id. at 59.
65. See, e.g., Benoît Gauthier, CIRCUM NETWORK INC., Assessing Survey Research: A
Principled
Approach
(Mar.
2,
2003),
http://www.circum.qc.ca/textes/assessing_survey_research.pdf (proposing guidelines for
assessing a survey’s effectiveness).
66. Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 236–69 (Joe Cecil & Dean Miletich eds., 2000).
67. See generally, DAVID A. AAKER ET AL., MARKETING RESEARCH (10th ed. 2009)
(discussing marketing research theories and methodologies).
68. E.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 283
n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d
467, 476 (3d Cir. 1990)); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir.

BIRD_FINAL_2379679.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1026

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

7/16/2012 5:30 PM

[Vol. 14:4

survey has strongly suggested to some courts that the contents of the survey
would have been unfavorable if administered.69 One judge contrasted the
“enormous sums” the plaintiff invested in market research for its product
launch with its failure to commission a consumer survey in litigation, and
thus drew an adverse inference from the absence of a survey.70 A
defendant, who has no burden of proof in trademark infringement cases,
was even faulted for failing to produce a survey in court.71 Courts have
expressed little sympathy even for small companies lacking the financial
resources to shoulder the extraordinary costs of survey design and
implementation.72
Some commentators have similarly elevated consumer surveys to high
evidentiary importance. A consumer survey is believed to attract so much
attention that it can distract the court from other important evidence.73 One
commentator canvassing court cases remarked that when a plaintiff chooses
not to present a consumer survey, the owner of the trademark may be
perceived as “less than deadly serious about its case.”74 Another stated that
“[s]electing and performing a consumer survey for use as evidence in a
trademark dispute represents one of the most important decisions made by

1989) (“An expert survey of purchasers can provide the most persuasive evidence of
secondary meaning.”) (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358
(9th Cir., 1985))); McNeil Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners L.L.C., 566 F.
Supp. 2d 378, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“[C]onsumer surveys are useful, and indeed the most
direct method of demonstrating secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion . . . .”)
(quoting Charles Jacquin Et Cie, 921 F.2d at 476)).
69. See Charles Jacquin Et Cie, 921 F.2d at 475–76 (noting that while consumer
surveys are not necessary to establish likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, a
plaintiff’s failure to conduct a survey when it has the means to do so could lead a jury to
believe that the results of the survey would be unfavorable to the plaintiff); E.S. Originals
Inc. v. Stride Rite Corp., 656 F. Supp. 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding it significant that
the defendant failed to conduct a consumer survey when it had the means to do so,
indicating that the defendant did not believe that it could demonstrate likelihood of
confusion). But see Edelman, supra note 49, at 768–69 (concluding that some courts draw
an adverse inference from a party’s failure to present survey data, while others treat a lack of
survey data neutrally).
70. Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 373 (D.N.J. 2002).
71. Gimix, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., No. 80 C 6592, 1982 WL 52164, at *1006 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 13, 1982).
72. Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 154,
164 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining that a plaintiff’s burden to produce probative evidence of
confusion, such as by means of a consumer survey, is not conditioned on plaintiff’s financial
resources).
73. See James Swire, Remarks at Panel Discussion, Legal Standards for Consumer
Survey Research, 23 J. ADVERTISING RES. 19 19, 23 (1983) (describing how a defective
survey harmed a litigant’s otherwise strong case).
74. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 32:195.
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trial counsel . . . .”75 Still another called surveys “all but indispensable” in
successfully demonstrating that a trademark is worthy of protection.76
At the same time, judges have not been reluctant to discount consumer
surveys if they conclude that the survey methodology was flawed.
Consumer surveys in court undergo an aggressive examination for
methodological flaws by experts hired by the opposing party.77 As a result,
criticisms related to virtually every aspect of a survey’s design—including
selection of sample, interviewer bias, suggestive wording, and
inappropriate purchasing conditions—often give judges reason to discount
surveys before them.78 The judge has to sift through the evidence to
determine whether the criticisms are valid. This process places consumer
surveys in the difficult position of being both supposedly essential evidence
and highly vulnerable to criticism. This complicated role of surveys makes
the need to test them empirically and understand their impact in trademark
cases all the more compelling.
D.

Data-Driven Research on Consumer Survey Use in Federal Court

Studies that look beyond individual cases to examine a substantial
dataset of trademark case law are most relevant to our research. While
case-based analysis has existed for decades, data-driven research is a more
recent vintage. For example, Jacoby and Morrin reviewed several federal
trademark infringement cases from 1994 through 1997 that were published
in a commercial legal database.79 The authors concluded, among other
findings, that courts often heavily discount survey evidence and that a lack
of convergence exists on how to measure the likelihood of confusion in
trademark infringement cases.80
More recent work systematically analyzes larger datasets. For
example, one study examined the relationship between plaintiffs’
presentation of survey and actual confusion evidence and injunction
outcomes in 126 federal trademark infringement cases between 2001 and

75. Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based
Survey Methods, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 91 (2004).
76. Joshua M. Dalton & Ilisa Horowitz, Funny When You Think About It: Double
Entendres and Trademark Protectibility, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 649, 652
(2006).
77. See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 32:178 (“It is notoriously easy for one survey expert to appear
to tear apart the methodology of a survey taken by another.”).
78. Id. at § 32:171 (observing that courts discredit the evidential weight of deficient
surveys).
79. Jacoby & Morrin, supra note 23, at 17.
80. Id. at 103–04.
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2006.81 The authors found that plaintiffs received a modest improvement in
outcomes through the presentation of actual confusion or survey evidence.82
The authors reported that their results are not statistically significant. This
means that the authors could not sufficiently discount the reasonable
possibility that the results could have occurred by chance.83 Nonetheless,
the authors noted that the results were still directionally interesting and
showed that the odds of winning improved only slightly with presentation
of actual confusion or survey evidence.84
Of greatest relevance to our research is a thoughtful study by Barton
Beebe.85 While our focus here is the treatment of consumer surveys in
federal courts, Beebe’s work studied the varying application across circuits
of multifactor tests for likelihood of confusion. Beebe examined 331 triallevel opinions that articulated the multifactor test of consumer confusion in
trademark cases between 2000 and 2004.86 He used regression trees to
investigate what factors were most influential in determining likelihood of
confusion in trademark infringement cases.87
His results were consistent with the proposition that courts do not
consider all factors in their circuit’s multifactor test for likelihood of
confusion.88 Instead, Beebe found that courts simply examined a few
81. Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1417, 1423.
82. Id. at 1430.
83. By contrast, findings of statistical significance can make such a conclusion about
empirical results. See, e.g., Lisa Faigman, The “M Word” Symposium: An Interdisciplinary
Adventure, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 25 n.96 (2012) (“In scientific studies, if an
observed difference does not rise to the level of ‘statistical significance,’ it essentially means
that the observed findings could have occurred by chance.”); Bradley W. Joondeph, The
Partisan Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the United States Courts of Appeals, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 223, 237 (2011) (“[A] finding of statistical significance means that if the null
hypothesis is true, there is less than a 5% chance that we would see the observed
difference.”). Expressed more technically, a non-statistically significant finding means that
a statistical comparison (such as a t, F, or chi value statistic) did not reach the critical level
of having a probability of appearing of .05 or less if all differences were purely random.
This critical level is often denoted p < .05. Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional
Behavior Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 175, 201 n.160 (2011). As Zirkel explains:
Chi-square is a statistical procedure to determine whether the frequency counts in
two or more categories in a sample . . . are differently distributed to a significant
extent, i.e., that the frequency counts are not due to chance but are instead
generally applicable with a high degree of probability to a population . . . .
Id. at 200 n.157.
84. Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1430.
85. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006).
86. Id. at 1593.
87. Id. at 1600.
88. Id. at 1599.
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factors through “fast and frugal” heuristics.89 In particular, Beebe
discovered that a court’s finding regarding the “[s]imilarity of the marks,”
“[p]roximity of the goods,” and “[s]trength of plaintiff’s mark,” favored
confusion in a dominant share of plaintiff verdicts.90 A subsequent study
expanded on Beebe’s inquiry to look at 224 cases from the Southern
District of New York that were published during a fifteen-year period.91
While Beebe’s primary focus was on the variation of application of the
multifactor test across the federal circuits, Beebe’s analysis only briefly
addressed survey data.92
For our work on consumer surveys, the relevant question is what
impact surveys have on the outcome of court cases. Our research builds on
the aforementioned work on multifactor tests of trademark infringement
and consumer surveys and offers a novel contribution to the literature on
likelihood of confusion cases. The study methods and presentation of the
data follow.
II.

STUDY METHODS AND PRESENTATION OF DATA

A.

Data Collection

The data for this study were collected from published opinions in
trademark infringement cases involving confusion written by federal trial
court judges in the United States between 2000 and 2006.93 For the years
2000 through 2004, we obtained Beebe’s dataset. This is the same dataset
that Beebe used in his examination of the multifactor tests of trademark
infringement.
In addition to Beebe’s dataset, we hand-coded two additional years of
data (2005 and 2006), following the same coding methods Beebe used for
the prior years. We obtained data by gathering opinions using Westlaw and
LexisNexis, two commercial legal research databases, and used search
terms to capture any opinion which discussed a multifactor test for proving

89. Id. at 1602.
90. Id. at 1611, Table 4.
91. Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton
Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2010).
92. Beebe, supra note 85, at 1622, 1641–42.
93. This paper focuses primarily on trademark infringement claims that sought to show
consumer confusion between the senior (established) mark and the junior adoption of its
mark. We do not explicitly explore disputes involving misappropriation, licensing, dilution,
or false advertising, although we certainly hold open the possibility that our findings here
have some relevance to these classes of cases.
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trademark infringement in any meaningful way.94
Similar to Beebe, we reviewed the judicial opinions from these results
and eliminated any case that did not make substantial use of a multifactor
test of the factors in Table 1. We also removed from the dataset any cases
that involved counterfeiting, franchising, licensing, or a distribution
agreement that might skew the results.95 Like Beebe, we did not
incorporate appellate decisions into our dataset to avoid redundancy.96 We
also did not consider claims of trademark dilution.
Our data collection and coding returned 202 additional cases. Adding
these cases to Beebe’s dataset of 311 created a total of 533 federal
trademark cases for our entire dataset. The vast majority of these additions
were cases published in 2005 and 2006. A small number of the cases
added (fifteen) were opinions written between 2000 and 2004 that fit
Beebe’s criteria but were not included in Beebe’s dataset, apparently
because of delayed reporting by LexisNexis and Westlaw.
From this dataset, we examined how courts treated all likelihood of
confusion factors relevant in their circuit. As noted earlier, each federal
circuit has its own likelihood of confusion standard.97 Coding whether a
court concluded that a given factor favored or disfavored confusion was
relatively straightforward. Courts typically state explicitly whether a given
factor favored confusion, disfavored confusion, or had no effect. When a
court did not discuss a factor, deemed it not relevant, or otherwise left it not
clearly resolved, we coded accordingly.
Our dataset also notes whether or not the plaintiff or defendant
submitted a survey. Our dataset reports whether a submitted survey was
credited by the court. We considered a survey to be credited if the judge
indicated that, despite any flaws, the survey contained at least some
probative value in favor of the party submitting the survey. For example, if
the plaintiff submitted a survey and the court found that the survey helped
show a likelihood of confusion, despite problems with the survey’s
methodology, we considered that survey to be credited by the court.
Two caveats from our data collection process bear mentioning. First,
94. For the district courts of each circuit, Beebe ran the following search in Westlaw:
(“trademark infringement” & confus!) or (“trademark mark” & “likelihood of confusion”) &
da(aft 12/31/1999 & bef 01/01/2005). For LexisNexis, Beebe ran the following search:
(“trademark infringement” & confus!) or ((trademark mark) & “likelihood of confusion”)
and date(geq (01/01/2000) and leq (12/31/2005)). We followed these search criteria for the
additional two years coded.
95. In these cases, the likelihood of confusion is often quite clear and the factors
overwhelmingly favor the plaintiff.
96. Beebe, supra note 85, at 1593 (collecting only district court case data); Sarel &
Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1422–23 (describing the dataset).
97. See infra Table 1.
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the data only include cases that actually went to court. To the extent that
cases that settle differ from those that reach court, our findings do not
generalize to the universe of infringement lawsuits. These caveats apply to
similar studies on surveys as well.98 Indeed, there may be a difference
between those cases that reach court and those that do not. In those cases
that reach court, both sides believe that they have a chance to succeed.
Thus, our dataset will tend to include litigants who have the resources to
litigate as well as the confidence that their side will win in court.
Second, although we believe that using LexisNexis and Westlaw to
gather cases represents a substantially comprehensive review of the cases
during the study period, the electronic databases do not report every
judicial opinion in the United States. LexisNexis and Westlaw, although
generally quite thorough, have their own methods of selecting opinions for
inclusion in their database and exclude according to certain criteria.99 In
spite of this limitation, we have no reason to believe that the cases reported
by Lexis and Westlaw are inaccurate reflections of federal trademark
infringement court decisions nationwide.
B.

Plan of Analysis and Justification

We performed our analysis in multiple stages. Our first task was to
answer the basic question of how often litigants submitted consumer
surveys as evidence in trademark infringement cases. In order to answer
this question, we simply counted the number in which surveys were
submitted relative to the number of total cases in our dataset.
Even this simple count data can reveal meaningful information about
survey usage and court conduct. Most obviously, it reveals how often
survey data is used in trademark infringement cases. This frequency can
imply some information about influence of surveys over disputes. If the
frequency of survey data is high, this supports the belief that survey
evidence is indeed a common and even necessary proof to show likelihood
of confusion.100
The frequency of survey use also adds to the discussion on the
98. See Beebe, supra note 85, at 1597 (describing limitations of the data); Blum et al.,
supra note 91, at 4 (describing methodology for data analysis); Sarel & Marmorstein, supra
note 20, at 1422–23 (explaining survey methodology).
99. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties
and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1832 & n.100
(2005) (noting the selection biases inherent when using Westlaw and LexisNexis).
100. E.g., Edelman, supra note 49, at 747 (“[S]urvey evidence has become de rigeur in
trademark infringement cases.”); Simonson, supra note 16, at 364 (“[S]urveys are now
routinely employed to prove likelihood of confusion, and a failure to introduce a survey into
evidence often leads to harsh criticism by the courts.”).
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influence of science on judicial decision making. An important discussion
in the literature involves the susceptibility of judges to “junk science,” in
part because of their lack of empirical and mathematical training.101
Combining this information with the frequency of favorable results for the
survey user, we can speculate whether the mere presence of scientific
evidence such as a consumer survey, regardless of survey quality, might
generate a halo effect on the quality and persuasiveness of other evidence.
In addition to counting survey use, we classified our surveys
according to which litigant submitted the evidence to the court. This
variable segments the data according to whether a plaintiff or defendant
submitted the evidence. In rare cases, both plaintiff and defendant
submitted a survey in the same case, and we code such instances
accordingly.
We separate plaintiff from defendant because the parties have
different motivations in the production of evidence in a trademark dispute
involving consumer confusion. Their differing motivations might influence
the quality and emphasis of surveys that they construct. For example, the
plaintiff holds the burden of persuasion and therefore would be more
motivated to produce survey evidence to show consumer confusion.102 The
defendant, by contrast, must merely show that the plaintiff’s evidence was
insufficient.103 Thus, the defendant may be less motivated to submit a
survey that matches the complexity and expense of the plaintiff’s, if it
chooses to commission one at all. Therefore, the quantity and impact of
survey production might differ between plaintiff and defendant.
The second stage of our analysis, a series of logistic regressions,
produces insight into the effectiveness of surveys. We avoid simply
counting and cross-classifying survey usage with other variables. Such an
analysis might be subject to errors in interpretation because it does not
control for other evidence in the case.104 Our logistic regressions of the
101. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The
Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 776
(2010) (“[W]hile striving to avoid accepting ‘junk science’ into evidence, too many judges
have permitted statisticians and others to allow ‘junk law’ into the courts.”); Paul S. Miller
et al., Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientific Literacy, 77 JUDICATURE 254 (1994)
(arguing for systematic judicial education on science and the scientific method).
102. See Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and
Procedural Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1027, 1062 (2007) (describing the opposite evidentiary burdens of plaintiff and defendant);
see also Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, What’s Good for the Goose Is Bad for the
Gander: Why Confusion Surveys for Plaintiff and Defendant Should Be Different, 16
INTELL. PROP. J. 177 (2003) (arguing that confusion surveys for defendants and plaintiffs
should not be similar).
103. Manta, supra note 102, at 1062 (noting lower burden of persuasion for defendants).
104. See Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An
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form Pr(Confusion Found) = f(Predictive Variables) enable such control
variables to be accounted for.
For additional variables, we first inquire into how a court treats survey
evidence. Not all surveys are treated equally by judges. Some courts reject
survey evidence out of hand as being insufficiently persuasive or lacking
scientific rigor; other courts are more receptive. We account for this
differential treatment by evaluating whether a survey was credited by a
court. As noted earlier, we consider a survey to be credited if the judge
indicated that, despite any flaws inherent in the survey, it still contained at
least some probative value.
Given that survey evidence can be a potentially powerful indicator of
consumer confusion in the minds of some judges,105 we posit that the
submission of survey evidence that the court believes has some probative
value will influence the outcome of the case. As noted earlier, plaintiffs
and defendants have different evidentiary burdens in trademark cases.
Thus, we also test the impact of plaintiff-credited surveys and defendantcredited surveys as separate variables.
We also consider whether the strength of a plaintiff’s claim on
grounds unrelated to survey evidence impacts the influence of consumer
surveys in court. For example, if the plaintiff already has a strong case of
infringement, a consumer survey might not be especially influential. A
weak case of infringement, by contrast, might be materially aided by a
survey. The impact of survey evidence might also be influenced by
whether the plaintiff or defendant submits it in a weak or strong case
context. For example, if the defendant submits a survey when the plaintiff
presents strong non-survey evidence of infringement, the survey might be
treated differently than when a plaintiff’s non-survey case is weak.
In addition, the impact of a credited or non-credited survey in
evidence might be influenced by the strength of non-survey evidence in the
case. For example, a plaintiff’s chances of winning might be irreparably
damaged by a non-credited survey if its non-survey evidence is of middling
Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 829 n.142 (2009) (“A control variable is a variable
that is held constant in order to analyze the relationship between other variables without
interference.”).
105. E.g., Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(describing the persuasiveness of survey evidence (citing Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Adver.
Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9. (8th Cir. 1985))); Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v.
Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, No. 09-80918-CIV, 2009 WL 6812111, at *17 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 13, 2009) (noting that consumer survey evidence is the best evidence of confusion
(citing Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1991)));
Jewish Sephardic Yellow Pages, Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 340, 364–65
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that consumer surveys are “‘particularly helpful in divining . . . the
principal significance’ of the term to the consuming public” (quoting Horizon Mills Corp. v.
QVC, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d, 208, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))).
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strength. Alternatively, a plaintiff marshaling strong non-survey evidence
might be forgiven if the survey evidence proves flawed or incomplete.
To measure the impact of non-survey evidence on survey receptivity,
we incorporate as variables the court’s evaluation of certain Polaroid
factors in the case. Incorporating every factor, however, remains a problem
because not all circuits apply all Polaroid factors.106 To ensure equanimity
across federal circuits, we limited our consideration only to factors that all
federal circuits rely upon when determining likelihood of infringement.
Out of the twelve Polaroid factors that courts consider, only four are
considered by all thirteen federal circuits.107 We eliminated the “evidence
of actual confusion” factor as a variable because courts sometimes consider
consumer surveys to be evidence of actual confusion, thus making reliance
on this factor as non-survey evidence redundant.108
That left three factors that were uniformly considered across the
federal circuits: the similarity of the litigants’ marks to one another, the
proximity of litigants’ goods to one another in the marketplace, and the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark amongst the public. We incorporate these
variables into our regression analysis to show the impact of non-survey
proof on consumer survey evidence.
Although only three variables of the possible twelve are considered in
this study, these variables can be helpful in illuminating our results. Beebe
found that these three variables were disproportionately predictive of the
outcome of cases.109 Beebe hypothesizes a “stampede effect” when courts
review these initial factors and then “stampede” the remaining factors in
order to conform to the initial factor outcomes.110 We thus conclude that
relying on these factors is potentially telling about the influence of the
106. See infra Table 1.
107. See infra Table 1.
108. See, e.g., 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 32:184 (“Several courts, when assembling the evidence
within a likelihood of confusion framework of factors such as the Polaroid Eight, have put
survey evidence under the heading of ‘actual confusion.’”). McCarthy is also careful to
conclude, however, that survey evidence is circumstantial and should not be treated as direct
evidence of a likelihood of confusion. According to McCarthy, direct evidence can only
come from communications from customers or the exceedingly rare testimony of an
individual confessing that they were once a confused consumer. Id.
109. Beebe, supra note 85, at 1622.
110. Id. at 1582, 1617–22. This occurs in spite of judicial admonitions that all factors
must be thoroughly considered in likelihood of confusion cases. See, e.g., Arrow Fastener
Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the district
judge to engage in a deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is inapplicable to a
case, to explain why . . . . The steady application of Polaroid is critical to the proper
development of trademark law . . . .”). The court cautions, however, that courts need not
slavishly recite all Polaroid factors in each and every case. Id. (quoting Orient Express
Trading Co., Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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Polaroid factors on survey evidence.
III. STUDY FINDINGS
In this section, we report the results of our analyses. We also discuss
how our findings contribute to our understanding of survey evidence and its
influence. While some results reinforce prevailing perceptions about
consumer surveys, others are unexpected and surprisingly illuminating.
A.

Frequency of Use of Consumer Survey Evidence

Our data show that survey use is not widespread in reported trademark
infringement litigation. Out of the 533 cases reviewed for our dataset, only
eighty-nine (16.6%) discuss survey evidence. A plaintiff submitted a
survey in seventy-four of these cases, defendants in twenty-three, and in
eight cases both plaintiff and defendant submitted a survey.111
Thus, even though survey evidence has attracted significant scholarly
and judicial attention, we find no evidence that surveys are used by a
majority or even a large plurality of litigants to prove likelihood of
confusion in federal court. Our results seem to contradict the exhortation
by some courts and commentators that consumer survey evidence is
necessary or even strongly recommended to prove trademark infringement.
The apparent implication is that consumer surveys are not especially
useful in likelihood of confusion cases. If a company is going to court
without survey evidence, and presumably believing themselves to have a
reasonable chance of success without such evidence, then a firm may want
to consider seriously the time and expense involved before commissioning
survey evidence in a trademark dispute. Global conclusions cannot be
made from this result alone, but this surprising result appears to throw into
question the notion that survey evidence is commonplace and an essential
component of trademark infringement cases.
Even though our results show that survey evidence is not present in
the majority of federal cases, one should take care not to dismiss the
importance of survey evidence entirely. In spite of these results, a real
possibility exists that consumer surveys still have an indirect effect on
likelihood of confusion cases even if they do not appear in judicial
opinions.
For example, surveys can be conducted internally by a company and
never be used in court. A firm may commission a survey to determine

111. Beebe reported survey usage in twenty percent of the cases in his dataset. Beebe,
supra note 85, at 1641.
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whether a trademark infringement suit is viable against a rival. The survey
may produce unfavorable results and get discarded, resulting in the lawsuit
never taking place. It is thus possible that the weakest survey evidence
never leaves the corporation for which it was commissioned.
If a company commissions a survey and its results are encouraging, it
can still have an impact outside of the federal courtroom. Firms, most
likely large firms with significant resources, may use survey results as
leverage to extract a favorable settlement from an infringing rival. The
rival may evaluate the survey results, realize that its chances of
successfully defending against a trademark infringement claim are small,
and settle the claim. Surveys can be and are instrumental in settlement
negotiations.112 Thus, the mere potential of survey evidence used against a
potential litigant could compel it to resolve the dispute out of court.
Even if litigation begins, we cannot divine from published court
opinions how often surveys are used, not in litigation, but outside of the
courtroom. It is therefore possible that we underestimate the use of surveys
in trademark litigation since the data we analyze exclude those cases in
which surveys were used but never surfaced in a court’s judicial opinion.
Although we cannot say for certain, what we observe in the federal court
system may merely be the “tip of the iceberg” of survey usage in
trademark-related disputes.113 Nevertheless, the absence of consumer
surveys in the vast majority of court decisions is striking and suggests that
observers who view surveys as essential may overstate their influence.
Another possible explanation of ours is that survey evidence may have
been submitted, but never written about, in the judge’s opinion. Such
conduct would result in an artificially low percentage of survey cases
reported. To account for this potential problem, we randomly selected
legal briefs from thirty non-survey cases to see if they mentioned survey
evidence or the submission of a survey by the plaintiff or defendant. None
were found. This suggests that judicial opinions ignoring submitted
surveys are unlikely and that consumer survey evidence is indeed sparse in
our data.
B.

Ability to Help Prove Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark
Infringement Cases

Although we now know that consumer surveys are typically not used
in reported trademark infringement cases, it remains to be seen whether
112. See Jacob Jacoby, Experimental Design and the Selection of Controls in
Trademark and Deceptive Advertising Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 890, 890 (2002)
(noting that surveys are used for both litigation and settlement).
113. Id.
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surveys have any impact in proving or disproving a likelihood of
confusion. We begin our analysis with a simple count of wins and losses in
our dataset. Out of the 533 decisions mentioned above, there were 60
instances when the court could not determine whether the plaintiff proved a
likelihood of confusion because the case had factual issues that remained
unresolved. Of the 473 remaining cases, courts found likelihood of
confusion 242 times (approximately 51.1% of cases). Courts failed to find
likelihood of confusion 231 times (approximately 48.8% of cases).114 In
short, plaintiffs win about half of the time in trademark infringement cases
without accounting for the presence of survey evidence.
We further our analysis through the estimation of five logistic
regression models, displayed in Table 2. The table consists of five models,
with one model listed per column. Each model tests the impact of different
survey-related variables on the court’s finding of a likelihood of confusion.
Model 1 is the simplest of the five. Model 1 examines the relationship
between probability of a court finding a likelihood of confusion and
whether or not the plaintiff submitted a survey (logit). This model simply
inquires whether the plaintiff’s submission of survey, regardless of other
factors such as the quality of the survey or the strength of non-survey
evidence, impacts on a court’s likelihood of confusion finding. This model
also does not consider the impact of defendant-submitted evidence. Our
results reveal that no statistically significant relationship exists between
plaintiffs submitting a survey and a finding of likelihood of confusion.
While this may appear counterintuitive at first glance, and appears to offer
further proof of the relative irrelevance of survey evidence, we need to
withhold judgment until accounting for further variables.
Model 2 adds an additional variable by examining the correlation
between defendant-submitted surveys and likelihood of confusion
outcomes. Presumably, because a defendant needs only to counter the
plaintiff’s evidence in order to win, defendants proffer fewer surveys than
plaintiffs. Our dataset included twenty-three cases where the defendant
submitted survey evidence, and a court reached a decision in twenty of
those cases.
Although Model 2 raises issues of small sample size,115 it also yields
an interesting result: while a plaintiff’s submission of a survey does not
114. This roughly corresponds to Sarel and Marmorstein’s finding of a fifty percent
success rate in their dataset. Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1424.
115. See Matthew Laroche, Is the New York State Court of Appeals Still “Friendless?”:
An Empirical Study of Amicus Curiae Participation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 701, 754 (2009)
(“Where sample sizes are small, it is appropriate to exercise caution when interpreting the
results.”); see also 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, IN MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 32:171 (noting that small sample size problematic for
survey design).
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have a significant relationship on a finding of confusion, a defendant’s
submission negatively correlated with a finding of a likelihood of
confusion. This is not surprising in itself, but is intriguing when considered
in tandem with the lack of influence from plaintiffs’ submissions. This
implies that courts treat plaintiff surveys and defendant surveys differently.
A number of reasons may explain this phenomenon. First, plaintiffsubmitted survey evidence may be perceived as unsurprising by some
courts, since the plaintiff’s burden of proof motivates it to submit as much
evidence as possible. When a defendant submits survey evidence, by
contrast, it is a rare and thus an unexpected event. A defendant-submitted
survey may signal to the court that the defendant is serious about defending
its trademark usage. The survey may also signal to the court that the
defendant is confident about winning its case, although if a defendant were
so sure that consumers would not be confused then a survey would not be
necessary. A defendant-submitted survey may neutralize the scientific
“halo effect” that would accompany a plaintiff-submitted survey not
rebutted by other seemingly scientific evidence. Finally, a defendantsubmitted survey merely needs to show that one cannot conclusively
establish consumer confusion, an easier burden than the plaintiff must bear.
Model 3 introduces yet another variable, the impact of whether or not
a consumer survey was credited by the court. Model 3 investigates both
the impact of a plaintiff-submitted survey that is credited and a defendantsubmitted survey that is credited. Once again, the impact of a credited
survey differs according to which litigant submitted the survey. Our results
reveal that when the plaintiff submits a survey and the court credits that
survey as having probative value favorable to plaintiff, that credited survey
is strongly and significantly correlated with a finding of likelihood of
confusion by the court.116
The finding of Model 3 is not unexpected. A consumer survey
represents powerful scientific evidence of likelihood of confusion by
soliciting the opinions of the very group of consumers that is impacted by
the presence of competing marks. Such data should help plaintiffs prove

116. The probability that this finding in our data was the result of chance is miniscule,
represented by a p-value of less than .0001. As one author succinctly explains:
The “p” value is a statistical measure of probability. For example, a p value of
less than .05 indicates that the statistical likelihood that the observed result
occurred by chance is less than 5%, p< .01 means less than 1%, and so forth. A
lower p value indicates a higher statistical significance.
Hon. Donald E. Shelton et al., An Indirect-Effects Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI
Myth, The Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ Expectations for Scientific Evidence, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 18 n.60 (2009) (citing Mark J. Schervish, P Values: What They
Are and What They Are Not, 50 AMER. STATISTICIAN 203 (1996)).
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their case in court. Our results reveal that it is likely that plaintiffsubmitted survey evidence, when credited by the court, increases the
probably of a likelihood of confusion finding.
Model 3 for defendants produces a different result. Our results report
that a court-credited survey submitted by the defendant does not have a
statistically significant impact on the outcome of the dispute. Apparently it
is the presence of the defendant-submitted survey, rather than its
methodology, quality, or persuasiveness that has the favorable impact on
the court. This does not necessarily mean that defendants who are
conducting surveys should ignore basic survey methodology, but it may
imply that defendant-submitted surveys are not subjected to the same rigor
as their plaintiff-submitted counterparts. The fact that the defendant took
the time and effort to submit a survey appears to be enough. Submitting a
survey that is good enough to actually be credited by a court does not
appear to further strengthen a defendant’s case.
In Model 4, we test a set of different but important variables: the
Polaroid factors that underlie a finding of likelihood of confusion. As
noted earlier, the similarity of the litigants’ marks to one another, the
proximity of litigants’ goods to one another in the marketplace, and the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark amongst the public are the three Polaroid
factors that are most suitable for testing. These factors are shared by all
federal circuits and appear to have a strong influence over likelihood of
confusion findings. We test whether a court’s determination that a given
factor favors or disfavors finding likelihood of confusion actually has an
impact on the outcome of the dispute. Our results find that these three
factors are all influential. Each of these three factors, when found to favor
a finding of likelihood of confusion by the court, has a statistically
significant outcome on the result of the case. For example, when a court
finds that the trademarks are similar enough to favor a likelihood of
confusion finding, the court is significantly more likely to find likelihood
of confusion overall. This finding also works in reverse. When a court
concludes that one of these favors militates against a likelihood of
confusion finding, the court is overall less likely to reach an overall
likelihood of confusing finding. These three factors impact the ultimate
outcome of trademark infringement disputes.
Model 5, our most complex model, considers the impact of consumer
surveys in the context of the strength of the litigants’ non-survey evidence.
In the previous models, we discerned whether the presence of a survey, the
presence of a credited survey, or the author of the survey had a significant
impact on the likelihood of confusion finding. These models are
incomplete since the possibility exists that the non-survey Polaroid factors
may overwhelm the survey evidence and render it immaterial. Model 5
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addresses that problem by considering whether these variables still hold
influence when taking into account the impact of the Polaroid factors on
judicial outcomes.
This model reveals that survey evidence indeed remains influential in
likelihood of confusion cases, even when the influence of Polaroid factors
is separately taken into account. The pattern of significance corresponds to
that in Model 3. This verifies the inferences made above with respect to
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ credited and non-credited surveys. A credited
plaintiff survey increases the probability of a likelihood of confusion
finding, a non-credited plaintiff survey decreases it, and any defendant
survey increases the probability of a no likelihood of confusion finding.
Even when the non-survey likelihood of confusion factors are taken into
account, survey evidence remains influential.
C.

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Consumer Surveys

The five models reveal intriguing and useful information about the
influence of survey evidence in court. In addition, the algebraic form of the
logistic regression—upon which these models are based—allows us to
quantify the precise benefit of consumer survey evidence in a variety of
contexts. Not only can we learn about the directional impact of survey
evidence, but we can also understand more about the magnitude of that
impact in court.
Table 3 presents the magnitude of survey impact. Each row reflects
one possible combination of the three dominant likelihood of confusion
factors in a trademark infringement dispute. Courts could reach three
different possible conclusions regarding each factor: the factor favors a
confusion finding, the factor favors a no-confusion finding, or the factor
favors neither result. The number of permutations for three likelihood of
confusion factors, each having three possible evidentiary outcomes, totals
twenty-seven. Accordingly, Table 3 presents twenty-seven rows, each
representing one possible permutation.
The first three columns in Table 3 reflect these permutations. The
next four columns present the probability of confusion given the
combinations of factors in the first three columns in various instances.117
Column 4 presents the probability of a likelihood of confusion finding
when no survey is presented. Columns 5, 6, and 7 present the probability
of a likelihood of confusion finding in cases where only the plaintiff
submitted a survey, only the defendant submitted a survey, and when both

117. These probabilities are all based on Model 5 in Table 2 and assume that the surveys
are credited.
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parties submit a survey, respectively.
The last two columns measure the impact of plaintiff-submitted and
defendant-submitted surveys in each scenario.118 Each number represents
the change in probability of likelihood of confusion as a result of the
survey, given the particular scenario. For example, reviewing the first row
shows that when the court finds that all three Polaroid factors favor
confusion, a plaintiff-submitted survey increases the chances of a confusion
finding by 3.2%. A defendant-submitted survey reduces the chances of a
confusion finding by one percent under similar conditions.
As Table 3 shows, the impact of a survey varies widely depending on
the surrounding evidence. In some situations, survey evidence can have a
profound impact. For example, consider the criteria in Row 8 of Table 3.
This row assumes that the trademarks are similar (favoring confusion), the
products at issue are not similar (disfavoring confusion), and that it is
uncertain whether the strength of the mark favors confusion. In this case,
submission of a credited consumer survey would increase the probability of
a confusion finding from .097 to .864, assuming the defendant does not
submit a survey. This represents an apparent 76.7% increase in the
probability that a likelihood of confusion finding will occur from the
submission of a credited consumer survey by the plaintiff. In the same
scenario, the defendant’s submission of a credited survey appears to reduce
the probability of a likelihood of confusion finding by 61.5%.
Although showing mathematical impacts such as these can appear
overly convincing, one should interpret Table 3 cognizant of its limitations.
As noted earlier, only a fraction of our dataset contains cases where survey
evidence is evaluated by the court. Segmenting this portion of the dataset
by the three Polaroid factors only slices the size of the dataset into smaller
portions. The result of such segmentation is that the probabilities and
impacts in Table 3 should be interpreted as showing trends, rather than a
precise measurement of future effects.
These trends, however, reveal that surveys play varying roles for
plaintiffs. Surveys seem to be most helpful to plaintiffs when non-survey
proof is of middling strength. In each of the five scenarios where plaintiffsubmitted surveys appear most influential, there is a mix of “confusion,”
“no confusion,” and “neither” findings.119 Conversely, plaintiff-submitted

118. Each scenario assumes that when a plaintiff submits a survey, the defendant does
not submit survey evidence. The reverse applies to the column showing the impact of a
defendant-submitted survey. Indeed, the empirical likelihood of both plaintiff and
defendant submitting a survey in trademark infringement litigation is quite low.
119. For the convenience of the reader, the five evidentiary conditions when plaintiff’s
survey is most influential are reproduced here from Table 3:
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surveys do not appear to be influential when the plaintiff’s case is
particularly weak or strong. In each of the five conditions where plaintiffsubmitted survey evidence is least influential, two or more of the factors
indicate “confusion” or “no confusion.”120 In fact, the weakest and
strongest possible evidentiary conditions, whereby all three factors either
favor or do not favor confusion, are scenarios where plaintiff-submitted
survey evidence appears to have little effect. When key non-survey
evidence is especially strong, a plaintiff appears not to need survey
evidence in order to show a likelihood of confusion. When key non-survey
evidence is especially weak, survey evidence will typically be insufficient
to overcome a finding of no likelihood of confusion.
In the case of defendant-submitted evidence, similar principles apply.
Defendant-submitted surveys appear to be most influential in cases
involving middling evidence. Indeed, four of the five conditions in which
surveys are most influential for the plaintiff are the same conditions that are
most influential for the defendant. The conditions in which defendantsubmitted surveys are least influential also roughly correspond to plaintiffsubmitted surveys. Thus, defendant-submitted surveys play a comparable

SIMILARITY
MARKS

OF

Confusion
Confusion
No Confusion
Neither
Neither

SIMILARITY
PRODUCTS

OF

No Confusion
Neither
Confusion
Confusion
Neither

STRENGTH
OF
PLAINTIFF’S MARK
Neither
No Confusion
Confusion
No Confusion
Neither

IMPACT
PLAINTIFF’S
SURVEY
0.767
0.756
0.756
0.753
0.739

OF

Out of the five conditions, the no confusion/confusion/confusion scenario appears out of
place because it appears to represent a strong evidentiary case on behalf of the plaintiff.
However, the similarity of marks prong is overwhelmingly influential in trademark cases.
An adverse finding on this prong alone may be so devastating that it needs survey evidence
to bolster it, even though the other two dominant factors favor confusion. See Beebe, supra
note 85, at 1623 (concluding that “[t]he data clearly show that the similarity of the marks
factor is by far the most important factor in the multifactor test.”).
120. For the convenience of the reader, the five evidentiary conditions when plaintiff’s
survey is least influential are reproduced here from Table 3:
SIMILARITY
MARKS

OF

Neither
Confusion
No Confusion
No Confusion
No Confusion

SIMILARITY
PRODUCTS

OF

No Confusion
Confusion
Neither
No Confusion
No Confusion

STRENGTH
OF
PLAINTIFF’S MARK
No Confusion
Confusion
No Confusion
Neither
No Confusion

IMPACT
PLAINTIFF’S
SURVEY
0.057
0.032
0.032
0.018
0.002

OF
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role in trademark infringement cases. Where key Polaroid factors are
indeterminate, defendant-submitted surveys can play an influential role.
Where key Polaroid factors strongly point in one direction, defendantsubmitted surveys have little impact.
While remaining cognizant of the limitations mentioned above, these
probability measurements can enable primitive calculations to determine
whether a survey is financially viable under a given set of conditions. For
example, assume that a plaintiff-submitted survey improves the probability
of success by 10.5% or .105. A relatively small increase in the probability
of success might imply that a plaintiff should not submit a survey in this
instance.
This depends, however, on the expected benefit of the survey relative
to the value of the potential favorable verdict. Assume that the plaintiff
assesses the expected value of its claim, net of attorney’s fees and costs, at
$1,000,000. If a survey costs $100,000 to administer,121 and the survey
produces an incremental increase in probability of .105, the litigant should
conduct the survey because the benefit of the survey ($1,000,000 * 1.05 =
$105,000) is greater than the cost ($100,000) of creating it.
Thus, using Table 3, a litigant could improve his or her decisionmaking about whether to conduct a consumer survey by performing a
realistic assessment of its likelihood of confusion claim and financial data
based on court behavior in prior similar cases. Such calculations can be
made for any combination of the likelihood of confusion factors provided
based upon an objective assessment of the strength of one’s own legal
claim. Such a calculation is far from an exact science, given the limitations
of the data and the fact-sensitive nature of each trademark infringement
claim, but using this information may improve decisions and reduce
uncertainty in outcomes.
IV. REEVALUATING THE ROLE OF SURVEY EVIDENCE
We briefly consider, in light of these data, whether the role of survey
evidence in trademark infringement cases needs to be redefined. Courts
should refrain from making an adverse inference when litigants do not
submit a consumer survey as an evidentiary part of their case. As
discussed earlier, a number of judges have concluded that the absence of a
survey implies a weak case or outright laxness by the parties. However, as
our findings show, the significant majority of litigants do not use consumer
121. See Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey Evidence in Trademark Litigation: Science, Art
or Confidence Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 71, 85 n.30 (1990) (“A fairly reliable minisurvey can be done for $5,000 or less. The cost of a major survey tends to start at around
$30,000 and can run up to $100,000 or more.”).
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surveys in reported likelihood of confusion cases.
Thus, it is doubtful that the significant majority of trademark litigants,
and their associated attorneys, are lax. Instead, the choice is likely a
calculated decision to not submit such evidence based upon time, cost, and
administrative burdens. As noted earlier, consumer surveys are expensive
to design and implement.122 Plaintiffs with limited resources will not be
able to afford one. Litigants are also deterred from submitting survey
evidence because courts can be excessively picky about consumer survey
design,123 making it difficult to submit survey evidence that will reliably
pass judicial muster. There are also, as our findings show, calculated
financial reasons for choosing not to submit a survey given the assessed
strength of the claim.
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the entity responsible for
hearing specialized trademark cases such as appeals from patent examiners
and opposition proceedings filed against trademark applicants, explicitly
does not require parties to submit surveys and refuses to draw negative
inferences from the lack of survey evidence.124 The Board remarked that
“[n]either party is obligated, in a proceeding before the Board, to spend the
effort and expense to obtain such evidence.”125 The federal circuits
reviewing likelihood of confusion cases should follow the Board’s lead by
clearly and explicitly refusing to make an adverse inference from a lack of
survey evidence.
In the alternative, however, we acknowledge that there may be
situations in which a court may feel compelled to make a negative
inference in the absence of such evidence. If a negative inference must be
made from the lack of a survey, it may be appropriate under conditions
cited by Edelman.126 Edelman writes that the lack of survey evidence
should hurt a plaintiff’s case only if the case is suitable for a survey, there
is ample time to conduct a survey, no logistical obstacles are present, and
there is no other persuasive evidence of actual confusion.127 These criteria,
perhaps with the additional consideration of financial ability, create a
situation that could possibly create a negative inference. However, due to
the difficulties in survey construction and submission, such an adverse
inference should be rare indeed.
Although courts should not fault litigants for failing to marshal survey

122. Bird, supra note 20, at 104.
123. See Bird, supra note 13, at 283–84 (discussing Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 31
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1468, 1471 (W.D. Mo. 1994)).
124. McDonald’s Corp v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1274, 1276–77 (T.T.A.B. 1995).
125. Id. at 1277.
126. Edelman, supra note 49, at 766–67.
127. Id.
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evidence, such evidence can still retain significant persuasive power under
certain circumstances.
As a result, courts should evaluate the
methodological validity of survey evidence according to well established
criteria. There are already a number of sources, mentioned earlier, that
offer detailed and intelligent guidelines on all aspects of survey design.128
Our results show, though indirectly, that survey evidence is vulnerable to
arbitrary factors. For example, courts appear to treat plaintiff-produced
surveys and defendant-produced surveys differently. The mere submission
of a survey by a defendant appears to help her case, while a plaintiffsubmitted survey can potentially hurt her case if the court deems it flawed.
Although the burdens of proof are different between plaintiffs and
defendants, the evidentiary weight of a survey’s design and implementation
should not vary significantly simply due to which party submitted it.
Our research also adds a new dimension to the literature on survey
evidence—the status of the party making the submission—a characteristic
rarely studied in survey research.129 In theory, courts should treat survey
evidence equally, regardless of which party, plaintiff or defendant,
submitted the evidence. Our study finds, however, that courts treat survey
evidence differently according to whether the submitting litigant is a
plaintiff or a defendant. Future research studying the impact of consumer
surveys on court decisions or the construction of survey evidence in
litigation should incorporate this dimension. This research opens up the
possibility that survey evidence submitted in trademark dilution,130
deceptive advertising,131 and genericide132 cases may also be susceptible to
litigant-status preferences by the court.
Finally, the findings in this paper reinforce calls to reform the current
state of the Lanham Act multifactor test used in likelihood of confusion
cases. The current likelihood of confusion criteria potentially misleads
litigants into believing that all of the factors will be given equal weight.
While some courts affirm that all factors are equally important and must be
considered, a number of courts do not give each factor similar
importance.133 Our findings, as well as Beebe’s findings,134 that three
128. AAKER ET AL., supra note 67; Diamond, supra note 66; Gauthier, supra note 65.
129. Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, When Confusion Surveys Collide: Poor Designs
or Good Science?, 94 Trademark Rep. 781, 781–82 (2004) (discussing the lack of survey
research that takes account of party status).
130. Bird, supra note 20, at 102.
131. Stewart, supra note 52, at 15–16.
132. Taylor & Walsh, supra note 23, at 161.
133. Frank Mead, Note, Cocaine, Coffee Mugs, Sex, and Bug Killing Floor Wax:
Welcome to the Realm of Parody and the Likelihood of Confusion, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
305, 308–09 (1999) (“The test applied by the courts is called the ‘likelihood of confusion
test.’ However, the only thing that is confusing is the application of this test. To begin,
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factors are disproportionately influential, only reinforce the uncertainty of
the criteria. As Table 3 shows, even without survey evidence, when the
three aforementioned factors (similarity of the marks, proximity of the
goods, and strength of the plaintiff’s mark) favor confusion, courts find in
favor of the plaintiff more than 95% of the time. Other factors, such as the
sophistication of consumers and the similarity of advertising methods, are
less substantial considerations than the aforementioned critical factors.
Our findings reinforce the results of another study finding that the
consumer sophistication, a factor in determining likelihood of confusion,
was actually influenced by the similarity of brand names.135 This
conclusion supports our finding that similarity of marks is an influential
factor in determining likelihood of confusion. Our findings also generally
encourage further work that studies the impact of individual factors in the
likelihood of confusion criteria.136
Two possible recommendations can emerge from the issue of
disproportionate influence of the three dominant Polaroid factors. The first
recommendation is to establish a nationwide standard of likelihood of
confusion criteria across all federal circuits. Currently, each federal circuit
uses a different multifactor test, and despite multiple recent Supreme Court
opinions on trademark law, the Court has yet to adopt a nationwide
standard. Such a standard would help to develop more uniform precedent
and increase certainty of outcomes. The second recommendation is to
reduce the likelihood of confusion determination to the three dominant
factors mentioned earlier plus a fourth factor, actual evidence of confusion,
which would allow for admission of consumer surveys and other direct
evidence.
A less radical change would be to retain the non-dominant criteria, but
enable courts to use them only when the first dominant four factors do not
resolve the question of confusion. Given the explanatory power already
found, such situations would be infrequent, but would still allow judicial
flexibility if the court deemed it appropriate. In spite of the apparent need
for greater uniformity and clarity for likelihood of confusion criteria, the
Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to establish uniform factors
when it decided trademark infringement cases and has refused to do so.
each circuit court applies the test differently, utilizing only those factors it deems
important.”) (footnotes omitted).
134. Beebe, supra note 85, at 1591.
135. Daniel J. Howard et al., The Effects of Brand Name Similarity on Brand Source
Confusion: Implications for Trademark Infringement, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 250,
261–62 (2000).
136. Thomas R. Lee et al., Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated
Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 578–79 (2008); Jerre B. Swann, Sophistication and the
Sciences, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1309, 1314–15 (2007).
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Thus, the chance of such a reform remains unlikely.
V.

LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The results reviewed and the cost-benefit tools built in the previous
sections are only as valid as the data used to obtain them. We only
examined a seven-year period (2000–2006). It is not clear whether our
results are stable over time. Also, economic fluctuation may impact
whether litigation is brought (litigation is costly) and whether a survey is
conducted (surveys are expensive too), but this would only exacerbate the
low incidence of survey usage. In addition, we do not know about surveys
that were conducted, found to have unfavorable results, and never
introduced into evidence.
We do not know the role that surveys played in litigation that was
settled and never reached trial. It is possible, if not likely, that surveys play
a very different role in cases that settle than in those that go to trial. To the
extent that surveys force settlement, our estimate of the degree to which
they are used could be vastly understated. The limitation of the size of the
defendant-submitted survey dataset is also a limitation. Defendants
frequently limit themselves to critiquing the plaintiff’s survey methodology
and results. As such, our conclusions regarding defendants can only be
considered tentative owing to small samples.
Like any scientific research, no survey is perfect. As one survey
expert explained, “I know of no survey, in trademark litigation or
elsewhere, which fulfills one hundred percent the requirements of its
model.”137 As a result, future research is needed to examine under what
conditions surveys are most persuasive to a court. Some, although by no
means all, of the limitations in this research can be addressed in future
work.
Of particular interest for future research are cases where a litigant
submitted a survey that was credited by the court but the litigant still failed
to persuade the court overall. For plaintiffs, this would occur when a
plaintiff submitted a survey showing consumer confusion, the court
considered the survey credible, and the plaintiff still failed to prove
infringement. For defendants, this would occur when a defendant
submitted a survey showing little or no confusion, the court considered the
survey credible, and the plaintiff proved a likelihood of confusion anyway.
These cases may offer insight into what conditions negate the impact of an
otherwise persuasive survey. Such information might be useful for litigants

137. Robert C. Sorensen, Survey Research Execution in Trademark Litigation: Does
Practice Make Perfection?, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 349, 351 (1983).
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facing an opponent who has presented well-constructed consumer surveys
in court. Another intriguing topic for further study would be to examine
which factors evaluated to determine survey quality (i.e., universe, sample
size, interview techniques) are most vulnerable to judicial critique in order
to reveal issues most critical for future survey design. Although
encouraging studies exist about the nature of consumer surveys, there is
much to learn about their influence.
CONCLUSION
Brands are big business. They define the public face of organizations
and have immense power to shape the perception of consumers toward a
product or service. Brands are as vulnerable as they are valuable. Firms
can tarnish their own brands through strategic errors. Upstart rivals can
outflank brands with their own marketing strategies, making seemingly
new and innovative products appear out of date by comparison. While the
law does not interfere with fair competition, trademarks protect brands
from inappropriate consumer confusion created by a rival brand so similar
that it can be mistakenly associated with the established trademark.
The consumer survey is one of the most widely studied methods of
proving consumer confusion in court. The consumer survey has a radiance
of scientific certainty about it. Its scientific nature and direct questioning
of consumers may seem to some as disproportionally persuasive to a judge
lacking expert training. At first glance, one can wonder whether consumer
surveys are perceived by some as the magic bullet of trademark litigation.
This study reveals that we now know more than we once did about
consumer surveys’ use and importance. Consumer surveys are not used as
often as some would imply. They are also not universally influential.
While surveys can prove persuasive under certain conditions, they might
not be useful for litigants with particularly weak or strong evidence.
Presentation of survey evidence still remains an individual decision left to
the attorney and his trademark-owning client. However, litigants can now
make decisions that are at least partially informed by prior judicial activity
and experience. In some cases, the most efficient survey is the one that is
never commissioned in the first place.
While this article sheds light on consumer surveys, there is still much
to learn. Survey evidence exists in a variety of contexts outside trademark
infringement litigation, and an intriguing issue is to what extent the
conclusions offered here apply in other contexts. Empirical studies like
this one and those completed by other authors offer a springboard from
which to conduct further research. Although survey evidence may always
remain in some sense a “black box” of litigation, the further study of such
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evidence can provide important knowledge about the construction, use, and
reception of potentially highly persuasive and influential scientific
evidence in court.
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TABLE 1: FACTORS FEDERAL COURT CIRCUITS CONSIDER
CASES

IN

LIKELIHOOD

[Vol. 14:4

OF

CONFUSION

CIRC.

FACTOR

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

DC.

FED*

1

Similarity of the marks

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

2

Proximity of the goods

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

3

Evidence of actual confusion

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

4

Strength of plaintiff’s mark

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

5

Defendant’s intent

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

6

Sophistication of consumers

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

7

Similarity of advertising and
x

x

x

x

marketing methods

x

8

Similarity of sales facilities

x

9

Likelihood of bridging the gap

x

10

Comparative quality of the goods

x

11

Length of time of concurrent use without

12

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

evidence of actual confusion

x

Similarity in parties’ sales efforts

x

x

* We excluded from this study factors only used in the federal circuit.
Insufficient cases came from that circuit to produce meaningful results

Source: Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1581 (2006).
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TABLE 2: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RELATING SURVEYS TO PROBABILITY OF FINDING
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION {PR(C)}
VARIABLE

MODEL 1

MODEL 2

MODEL 3

MODEL 4

MODEL 5

-.112

c

-1.728

-2.634d

-.912b

-1.207a

-2.007a

Plaintiff’s Survey Credited

3.490e

6.714e

Defendant’s Survey Credited

.744

-.845

Plaintiff’s Survey

-.166

Defendant’s Survey

Similarity of Marks Favoring Confusion

2.210e

2.214d

Similarity of Marks Favoring No Confusion

-3.156e

-3.637e

Similarity of Products Favoring Confusion

1.235c

1.324c

Similarity of Products Favoring No Confusion

-2.763e

-3.037e

Strength of Plaintiff’s Mark Favoring Confusion

1.140b

1.267c

Strength of Plaintiff’s Mark Favoring No Confusion

-2.104e

-2.417e

Constant

.068

.098

.091

-1.390b

-1.411b

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD

655.09

651.47

619.09

198.48

176.39

a – p<.10
b – p< .05
c – p<.01
d – p<.001
e – p<.0001
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TABLE 3: PROBABILITIES OF FINDING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION {PR(C)} FOR
COMBINATIONS OF JUDICIAL FACTORS AND THE IMPACT OF SURVEYS
ROW
NUM

SIMILARITY OF

SIMILARITY OF

STRENGTHOF

PR(C

|NO

IMPACT

BER

MARKS

PRODUCTS

PLAINTIFF’S MARK

SURVEYS)

PLAINTIFF SURVEY

DEFENDANT SURVEY

1

Confusion

Confusion

Confusion

0.968

0.032

-0.010

2

Confusion

Confusion

Neither

0.893

0.104

-0.035

3

Confusion

Confusion

No Confusion

0.428

0.550

-0.280

4

Confusion

Neither

Confusion

0.888

0.110

-0.037

5

Confusion

Neither

Neither

0.691

0.302

-0.119

6

Confusion

Neither

No Confusion

0.166

0.756

-0.541

7

Confusion

No Confusion

Confusion

0.275

0.682

-0.417

8

Confusion

No Confusion

Neither

0.097

0.767

-0.615

9

Confusion

No Confusion

No Confusion

0.009

0.352

-0.332

10

Neither

Confusion

Confusion

0.765

0.230

-0.085

11

Neither

Confusion

Neither

0.478

0.504

-0.243

12

Neither

Confusion

No Confusion

0.076

0.753

-0.627

13

Neither

Neither

Confusion

0.464

0.517

-0.253

14

Neither

Neither

Neither

0.196

0.739

-0.505

15

Neither

Neither

No Confusion

0.021

0.541

-0.500

16

Neither

No Confusion

Confusion

0.040

0.671

-0.597

17

Neither

No Confusion

Neither

0.012

0.397

-0.374

18

Neither

No Confusion

No Confusion

0.001

0.057

-0.055

19

No Confusion

Confusion

Confusion

0.079

0.756

-0.626

20

No Confusion

Confusion

Neither

0.024

0.565

-0.519

21

No Confusion

Confusion

No Confusion

0.002

0.111

-0.106

22

No Confusion

Neither

Confusion

0.022

0.552

-0.508

23

No Confusion

Neither

Neither

0.006

0.269

-0.256

24

No Confusion

Neither

No Confusion

0.001

0.032

-0.031

25

No Confusion

No Confusion

Confusion

0.001

0.060

-0.057

26

No Confusion

No Confusion

Neither

0.000

0.018

-0.017

27

No Confusion

No Confusion

No Confusion

0.000

0.002

-0.002

OF

IMPACT

OF
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ROW NUMBER

PR(C|PLAINTIFF SURVEY)

PR(C |DEFENDANT SURVEY)

PR(C|BOTH SURVEYS)

1

0.999

0.609

0.989

2

0.998

0.305

0.963

3

0.978

0.038

0.698

4

0.998

0.293

0.961

5

0.992

0.104

0.873

6

0.922

0.010

0.381

7

0.957

0.019

0.540

8

0.864

0.006

0.249

9

0.361

0.000

0.029

10

0.995

0.145

0.910

11

0.982

0.046

0.739

12

0.829

0.004

0.202

13

0.981

0.043

0.728

14

0.935

0.013

0.430

15

0.563

0.001

0.063

16

0.711

0.002

0.114

17

0.409

0.001

0.035

18

0.058

0.000

0.003

19

0.835

0.004

0.209

20

0.588

0.001

0.069

21

0.113

0.000

0.007

22

0.574

0.001

0.066

23

0.275

0.000

0.019

24

0.033

0.000

0.002

25

0.061

0.000

0.003

26

0.018

0.000

0.001

27

0.002

0.000

0.000
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